Measuring Market Performance with Stochastic Demand: Price of Anarchy
  and Price of Uncertainty by Melolidakis, Costis et al.
Measuring Market Performance with Stochastic
Demand: Price of Anarchy and Price of
Uncertainty
Costis Melolidakis1, Stefanos Leonardos1 , and Constandina Koki2
1 National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 157 84 Greece,
cmelol@math.uoa.gr, sleonardos@math.uoa.gr
2 Athens University of Economics and Business, 104 34 Greece, kokiconst@aueb.gr
Abstract. Globally operating suppliers face the rising challenge of who-
lesale pricing under scarce data about retail demand, in contrast to better
informed, locally operating retailers. At the same time, as local businesses
proliferate, markets congest and retail competition increases. To capture
these strategic considerations, we employ the classic Cournot model and
extend it to a two-stage supply chain with an upstream supplier who
operates under demand uncertainty and multiple downstream retailers
who compete over quantity. The supplier’s belief about retail demand is
modeled via a continuous probability distribution function F . If F has
the decreasing generalized mean residual life property, then the supplier’s
optimal pricing policy exists and is the unique fixed point of the mean
residual life function. We evaluate the realized Price of Uncertainty and
show that there exist demand levels for which market performs better
when the supplier prices under demand uncertainty. In general, perfor-
mance worsens for lower values of realized demand. We examine the effets
of increasing competition on supply chain efficiency via the realized Price
of Anarchy and complement our findings with numerical results.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Generalized Mean Residual Life, Con-
tinuous Beliefs, Price of Uncertainty, Price of Anarchy
1 Introduction
The increasingly present trend of geographically distributed markets affects sup-
ply chain performance in unexpected ways. Internationally operating suppliers
procure retailers via internet platforms or intricate networks with information
latency. Consumer data that is easily accessible to the retailers due to their
proximity to the market, may often not be available to their international sup-
pliers. Concurrently, and aided by new technologies, local retail businesses are
sprouting at a rapid pace. These trends give rise to new information and com-
petition structures between downstream members (retailers) and their upstream
contemporaries (suppliers) in modern supply chains.
The questions that rise in this changing environment, mainly concern the is-
sues of market efficiency. How does the market perform when the supplier prices
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without knowing the retailers willingness-to-pay for his product? Do competing
retailers have incentives to reveal private information to the supplier that they
may have about retail demand? To capture these considerations and study this
emerging phenomenon, in [7] and [8], we employ the classic Cournot model of
competition and extend it to the following two-stage game: in the first-stage (act-
ing as a Stackelberg leader), a revenue-maximizing supplier sets the wholesale
price of a product under incomplete information about market demand. Demand
or equivalently, the supplier’s belief about it, is modeled via a continuous proba-
bility distribution. In the second-stage, the competing retailers observe wholesale
price and realized market demand and engage in a classic Cournot competition.
Retail price is determined by an affine inverse demand function.
Classic models, see e.g., [4], [5], [9], [10], study market efficiency when de-
mand is realized after the strategic decisions of all supply chain members –
wholesale pricing and retailers’ orders. In contrast, performance of markets in
which uncertainty is resolved at an intermediate stage, has not been yet properly
understood.
Contributions – Outline: Based on the equilibrium analysis in [7], the present
paper aims to fill this gap by following the methodology of [5]. To measure the
effects of demand uncertainty and second-stage competition on market perfor-
mance and efficiency, we modify the tools of Price of Anarchy, as defined in [11]
and Price of Uncertainty, c.f. [1], to account for realized values of demand. In
Section 2, we provide the model description and in Section 3, the existing results
from [7] on which the current analysis is based. Our findings, both analytical and
numerical are presented in Section 4 and summarized in Section 5.
2 The Model
An upstream supplier (or manufacturer) produces a single homogeneous good at
constant marginal cost, normalized to 0, and sells it to a set of N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
downstream retailers. The supplier has ample quantity to cover any possible de-
mand and his only decision variable is the wholesale price r. The retailers observe
r and the market demand α and choose simultaneously and independently their
order-quantities qi (r | α) , i ∈ N . They face no uncertainty about the demand
and the quantity that they order from the supplier is equal to the quantity that
they sell to the market (in equilibrium). The retail price is determined by an
affine demand function p = (α− q (r))+, where α is the demand parameter or
demand level and q (r) :=
∑n
i=1 qi (r). Contrary to the retailers, we assume that
at the point of his decision, the supplier has incomplete information about the
actual market demand.
Game-Theoretic Formulation: This supply chain can be represented as a
two-stage game, in which the supplier acts in the first and the retailers in the
second stage. A strategy for the supplier is a price r ≥ 0 and a strategy for
retailer i is a function qi : R+ → R+, which specifies the quantity that retailer i
will order for any possible cost r. Payoffs are determined via the strategy profile
(r,q (r)), where q (r) = (qi (r))
n
i=1. Given cost r, the profit function pii (q (r) | r)
or simply pii (q | r), of retailer i ∈ N , is pii (q | r) = qi (α− q)+−rqi. For a given
value of α, the supplier’s profit function, pis is pis (r | α) = rq (r) for 0 ≤ r < α,
where q (r) depends on α via pii (q | r).
Continuous Beliefs: To model the supplier’s uncertainty about retail demand,
we assume that after his pricing decision, but prior to the order-decisions of
the retailers, a value for α is realized from a continuous distribution F , with
finite mean Eα < +∞ and nonnegative values, i.e. F (0) = 0. Equivalently, F
can be thought of as the supplier’s belief about the demand parameter and,
hence, about the retailers’ willingness-to-pay his price. We will use the notation
F¯ := 1 − F for the survival function and αL := sup {r ≥ 0 : F (r) = 0} ≥ 0,
αH := inf {r ≥ 0 : F (r) = 1} ≤ +∞ for the support of F respectively. The
instance αL = αH corresponds to the reference case of deterministic demand.
In any other case, i.e., for αL < αH , the supplier’s payoff function pis becomes
stochastic: pis (r) = Epis (r | α). All of the above are assumed to be common
knowledge among the participants in the market (the supplier and the retailers).
3 Existing Results
We consider only subgame perfect equilibria, i.e. strategy profiles (r,q (r)) such
that q (r) is an equilibrium in the second stage and qi (r) is a best response
against any r. The equilibrium behavior of this market has been analyzed in [7].
In the reference case of deterministic demand, i.e., for αL = αH , each retailer i =
1, 2, . . . , n orders quantity q∗i (r | α) = 1n+1 (α− r)+. Hence, the supplier’s payoff
on the equilibrium path becomes pis (r | α) = rq∗ (r | α) = nn+1r (α− r)+, for
0 ≤ r. Maximization of pis with respect to r yields that the complete information
two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, under which
the supplier sells with optimal price r∗ (α) = 12α and each of the retailers orders
quantity q∗i (r) =
1
n+1 (α− r)+, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. To proceed with the equilibrium
representation in the stochastic case, we first introduce some notation.
Generalized mean residual life: Let α ∼ F be a nonnegative random variable
with finite expectation Eα < +∞. The mean residual life (MRL) function m (r)
of α is defined as
m (r) := E (α− r | α > r) = 1
F¯ (r)
∫ ∞
r
F¯ (u) du, for r < αH
and m (r) := 0, otherwise, see, e.g., [3]. In [7], we introduced the generalized mean
residual life (GMRL) function ` (r), defined as ` (r) := m(r)r , for 0 < r < αH ,
in analogy to the generalized failure rate (GFR) function g (r) := rh (r), where
h (r) := f (r) /F¯ (r) denotes the hazard rate of F and the increasing generalized
failure rate (IGFR) unimodality condition, defined in [5] and studied in [6],[2]. If
` (r) is decreasing, then F has the (DGMRL) property. The relationship between
the (IGFR) and (DGMRL) classes of random variables is studied in [7].
Market equilibrium: Using this terminology, we can express the supplier’s
optimal pricing strategy in terms of the MRL function and formulate sufficient
conditions on the demand distribution, under which a subgame perfect equilib-
rium exists and is unique.
Theorem 1 ([7]). Assume that the supplier’s belief about the unknown, non-
negative demand parameter, α, is represented by a continuous distribution F ,
with support inbetween αL and αH with 0 ≤ αL < αH ≤ ∞.
(a) If an optimal price r∗ for the supplier exists, then r∗ satisfies the fixed point
equation
r∗ = m (r∗) (1)
(b) If F is strictly DGMRL and Eα2 is finite, then in equilibrium, the optimal
price r∗ of the supplier exists and is the unique solution of (1).
4 Supply Chain Efficiency
To study the degree in which demand uncertainty affects the realized market
profits, we fix a realized demand level α and compare the individual realized
profits of the supplier and each retailer between the scenario in which the supplier
prices before demand realization and the scenario in which the supplier prices
after demand realization. For clarity, the results are summarized in Table 1.
Upstream Demand for Supplier
Uncertain α ∼ F Deterministic α
Equilibrium
Wholesale Price
r∗ = mF (r∗) r∗ = α/2
Realized Profits in Equilibrium
Supplier ΠUs =
n
n+1r
∗ (α− r∗)+ ΠDs = nn+1 (α/2)2
Retailer i ΠUi =
1
(n+1)2
(
(α− r∗)+
)2
ΠDi =
n
(n+1)2
(α/2)
2
Aggregate ΠUAgg = Π
U
s +
∑n
i=1Π
U
i Π
D
Agg = Π
U
s +
∑n
i=1Π
U
i
Table 1. Wholesale price in equilibrium and realized profits when the supplier prices
under demand uncertainty (left column) and under deterministic demand (right col-
umn).
4.1 Price of Uncertainty
By Table 1, for each retailer, we have that 1
(n+1)2
(
(α− r∗)+
)2
≥ 1
(n+1)2
(
α
2
)2
for
all values of α ≥ 2r∗. This implies that for larger values of the realized demand,
the retailers are better off if the supplier prices under demand uncertainty. In con-
trast, the supplier is never better off when he prices under demand uncertainty, as
is intuitively expected. Indeed nn+1r
∗ (α− r∗)+ ≤ nn+1 (α/2)2 for all values of α,
Fig. 1. Ratio of the supplier’s realized
profits with and without demand uncer-
tainty for α ∼Weibull (1, 2).
with equality if and only if α = 2r∗.
The ratio of the supplier’s realized
profit in the scenario with demand
uncertainty to the scenario without
demand uncertainty is equal to 4 ·
r∗
α
(
1− r∗α
)
and hence it has the shape
shown in Figure 1, independently of
the underlying demand distribution.
Similar findings are obtained when
we compare the market’s aggregate re-
alized profits (supplier and retailers)
between these two scenarios. This is
accomplished via the ratio of aggregate
realized market profits under stochas-
tic demand to the aggregate realized market profits under deterministic demand,
which we term the realized Price of Uncertainty (PoU), motivated by a similar
notion that is studied in [1]. Specifically,
PoU := sup
F∈G
sup
α
{
ΠUAgg
ΠDAgg
}
= sup
F∈G
sup
α
{
ΠUs +
∑n
i=1Π
U
i
ΠDs +
∑n
i=1Π
D
i
}
in which we restrict attention to the class G of nonnegative DGMRL random
variables to retain equilibrium uniqueness. Intuitively, one expects the system to
perform worse under demand uncertainty which translates to PoU being bounded
above by 1. However, this is not the case as the next Theorem states.
Theorem 2. The realized PoU of the stochastic market is given by PoU = 1 +
O (n−2), independently of the underlying demand distribution. The upper bound
is attained for realized demand α∗ = nn−1 · 2r∗.
Proof. By Table 1, a direct substitution yields that the inner ratio is equal to
ΠUs +
∑n
i=1Π
U
i
ΠDs +
∑n
i=1Π
D
i
=
n
n+1r
∗ (α− r∗)+ + n
(
1
n+1 (α− r∗)+
)2
n
n+1
(
α
2
)2
+ n
(n+1)2
(
α
2
)2
Hence, PoU = supF∈G supα
{
4
(n+2)α2 (α− r∗)+ (α+ nr∗)
}
. For realized demand
α < r∗, there is a stockout and the market operates worst under demand un-
certainty. However, for realized demand values α > r∗, the aggregate market
profits of the supplier and the retailers may be larger if the supplier prices under
demand uncertainty. To see this, we take the partial derivative of the previous
ratio with respect to α
∂
∂α
(
4
(n+ 2)α2
(α− r∗)+ (α+ nr∗)
)
=
4r∗
(n+ 2)α3
(2nr∗ − α (n− 1))
which shows that the ratio is increasing on [r∗, 2nn−1r
∗), and decreasing thereafter.
The ratio is maximized for α = 2nn−1r
∗, yielding a value of 1 + 1n2+2n , which does
not depend on the underlying distribution F and which is larger than 1 for any
number n of competing second-stage retailers. uunionsq
The values for which the ratio exeeds 1, depend on n. Specifically, for n ≥ 3,
we have that 4(n+2)α2 (α− r∗)+ (α+ nr∗) ≥ 1 for values of α in [2r∗, 2nn−2r∗]. In
this case, the upper bound decreases to 2r∗ as n → ∞. For n = 2, the upper
bound is equal to infinity, i.e., the range of α for which the ratio exceeds 1 is
equal to [2r∗,+∞). In all cases, the lower bound is independent of n. Finally, by
taking the partial derivative with respect to n, we find that the PoU is nonde-
creasing in n for realized values of α in [r∗, 2r∗] and decreasing in n thereafter,
again independently of the underlying demand distribution. This is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Ratio of the aggregate market realized profits with and without demand uncer-
tainty for n = 2 to n = 10 with α ∼ Gamma (2, 2). The dashed curve in the left panel
passes through the points α∗ = n
n−1 · 2r∗ on which the PoU is attained for each n. The
curves are decreasing in n, i.e. the highest curve corresponds to n = 2 and the lowest
to n = 10. The right panel shows the behavior of the curves in a neighborhood of their
intersection point, 2r∗ ≈ 5.657. Prior to the intersection, the ratio is increasing in n,
whereas after the intersection the ratio is decreasing in n.
4.2 Price of Anarchy
As a benchmark, we will first determine the equilibrium behavior and perfor-
mance of an integrated supply chain. The integrated firms’ decision variable is
now the retail price r, and hence its expected profit piInt is given by piInt (r) =
rE (α− r)+ = rm (r) F¯ (r). By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1,
piInt is maximized at r
∗ = m (r∗). In particular, the equilibrium price of both the
integrated and non-integrated supplier is the same. Hence, the integrated firm’s
realized profit in equilibrium is equal to ΠUInt (r
∗ | α) = r∗ (α− r∗)+.
In a similar fashio to [11], we define the realized Price of Anarchy (PoA) of
the system as the worst-case ratio of the realized profit of the centralized supply
chain, ΠUInt, to the realized aggregate profit of the decentralized supply chain,
Realized Profits in Equilibrium
Uncertain Demand α ∼ F Deterministic Demand α
Integrated Firm ΠUInt = r
∗ (α− r∗)+ ΠDInt = (α/2)2
Table 2. Realized profits for the integrated firm under the two scenarions. The equi-
librium wholesale prices remain the same as in the decentralized market, cf. Table 1.
ΠUDec := Π
U
s +
∑n
i=1Π
U
i . Again, to retain equilibrium uniqueness, we restrict
attention to the class G of nonnegative DGMRL random variables. If the realized
demand α is less than r∗, then both the centralized and decentralized chains
make 0 profits. Hence, we define the PoA as: PoA := supF∈G supα>r∗
{
ΠUInt
ΠUDec
}
.
We then have
Theorem 3. The realized PoA of the stochastic market is given by PoA = 1 +
1/n independently of the underlying demand distribution. The upper bound is
asymptotically attained for α↘ r∗.
Proof. By a direct substitution in the definition of PoA, the inner term equals
(n+1)2
n ·
(
n+ αr∗
)−1
. Since
(
n+ αr∗
)−1
decreases in the ratio α/r∗, the inner sup
is attained asymptotically for α↘ r∗. Hence,
PoA = sup
F∈G
{
(n+ 1)
2
n
· (n+ 1)−1
}
= 1 +
1
n
(2)
Fig. 3. Ratio of the integrated firm’s to the
decentralized market’s aggregate profits
for n = 2, . . . , 20 with α ∼ Gamma (2, 2).
For each n the realized PoA is attained as
α ↘ r∗ ≈ 2.83. For n (α− 2r∗) ≤ α, the
curves are nonincreasing in n, which re-
sults in the nonlinearity (with respect to
n) for values of α in [2r∗, 3r∗].
Theorem 3 implies that the mar-
ket becomes less efficient in the worst-
case scenario, i.e., for a realized de-
mand α↘ r∗, as the number of down-
stream retailers increases. In general,
as can be directly inferred by partial
differentiation with respect to n, for
realized values of α < 2r∗, the inner
term of the sup expression in (2) is
decreasing in n. For realized values of
α ≥ 2r∗, the ratio is increasing in n
when n ≥ α/ (α− 2r∗) and decreas-
ing in n otherwise. These findings are
shown graphically in Figure 3.
Finally, a similar calcuation yields
that the PoA of the deterministic mar-
ket is equal to 1 + O (n−2). The real-
ized demand α simplifies in the inner
ratio and hence this upper bound is constant and independent of the demand
level. Notably, the PoA in the deterministic market is equal to PoU in the
stochastic market, cf. Theorem 2.
5 Conclusions
The present study complements the findings of [7] and [8], by focusing to the
effects of demand uncertainty on market efficiency. Based on the realized market
profits, we measured the effects of uncertainty via the realized Price of Uncer-
tainty. Counterintuitively, there exist demand levels for which the retailers’ and
the market’s aggregate profits are higher when the supplier prices under demand
uncertainty. This is achieved in expense of the supplier’s welfare who is always
better off under deterministic demand. The realized Price of Anarchy revealed
that for any demand level, the integrated chain performs better – in terms of
efficiency – as the number of competing retailers increases. Upper bounds of inef-
ficiency are attained for lower values of realized demand. Despite these intuitions,
the present analysis is limited in extent. Price differentiation and mechanisms
that will incentivize retailers to honestly reveal their private information about
demand, constitute promising lines of ongoing research.
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